Abstract-This work establishes sufficient conditions for existence of saddle points in discrete Markov games. The result reveals the relation between dynamic games and static games using dynamic programming equations. This result enables us to prove existence of saddle points of non-separable stochastic differential games of regime-switching diffusions under appropriate conditions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The merge of differential games and regime-switching models stems from a wide range of applications in communication networks, complex systems, and financial engineering. Many problems arising in, for example, pursuitevasion games, queueing systems in heavy traffic, risksensitive control, and constrained optimization problems, can be formulated as two-player stochastic differential games [1] , [2] , [3] . In another direction, recent applications for better describing the random environment leads to the use of the so-called regime-switching models; see [8] , [11] , [14] , [19] , [20] and references therein. For many problems arising in applications, closed-form solutions are difficult to obtain. A viable alternative is to use numerical approximations [10] , [12] , [15] . A systematic approach of numerical approximation for stochastic differential games was provided in [6] using Markov chain approximation methods. The major difficulty in dealing with such game problems is to prove the existence of the value of the game. To ensure the existence of saddle points, separability with respect to controls for objective function and the drift of the diffusion is required in [6] . It would be nice to be able to relax the separability condition.
Markov chain approximations of stochastic differential games are discrete Markov games. In this paper, we aim to develop sufficient conditions for the existence of saddle point of discrete Markov games. In the proof, we start with dynamic programming equation together with static game results obtained by Sion [13] and von Neumann [9] , and discover the relations between static games and dynamic games by a series of inequalities. This approach enables us to treat non-separable discrete Markov games with respect to controls. Using results for discrete Markov games, we can easily prove the existence of saddle points of discrete Markov games arising in numerical approximations of stochastic differential games when a discretization parameter h is used. As h → 0, we are able to obtain the existence of saddle points of non-separable stochastic differential games using weak convergence techniques in [7] and [6] .
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section II begins with the formulation of the discrete Markov games. Section III presents sufficient conditions for the existence of saddle points of discrete Markov games for both ordinary control and relaxed control spaces, respectively. Section IV applies the results in the discrete Markov games to stochastic differential games. Section V concludes the paper with further remarks.
II. FORMULATION
Consider a two-player discrete Markov zero-sum game. Let S be a finite state space of a Markov chain, and ∂S ⊂ S be a collection of absorbing states. Control space U 1 and U 2 for player 1 and player 2 are compact subsets of R.
[For notational simplicity, we have chosen to treat realvalued controls in this paper.] Let {ξ n , n < ∞} be a controlled discrete-time Markov chain, whose time-independent transition probabilities controlled by a pair of sequences
where u i,n ∈ U i denote the decision at time n by player i. Definition 2.1: A sequence {(u 1,n , u 2,n ), n < ∞} for the Markov chain {ξ n , n < ∞} is admissible ordinary control or admissible control if (u 1,n , u 2,n ) ∈ U 1 × U 2 , and
(2) If there is a function u i (·) such that u i,n = u(ξ i ), then we refer to u i (·) as a feedback control of player i.
Given the running cost function c(·, ·, ·) :
, and the terminal cost function g(·) : S → R + ∪{0}, the cost for an initial ξ 0 = x ∈ S and an admissible control policy (u 1 , u 2 ) = {(u 1,n , u 2,n ) : n < ∞} is defined by (3) where N = min{n : ξ n ∈ ∂S} and E u1,u2 x is the expectation given that initial ξ 0 = x and control (u 1 , u 2 ).
In the discrete Markov game, player 1 wants to minimize the cost, while player 2 wants to maximize it. The two players have different information available depending on who makes the decision first (or who "goes first"). Using U i (1) to denote the space of the admissible ordinary controls that player i goes first. That is, for u i ∈ U i (1), there exists a sequence of measurable functions F n (·) taking values in (2) to denote the collection of the admissible ordinary controls that player i goes last, that is, u i ∈ U i (2) is determined by a sequence of measurable functions
To proceed, we define upper and lower values by
respectively. It is obvious
If the lower value and upper value are equal, then we say there exists a saddle point for the game, and its value is
The corresponding dynamic programming equation is
Practically, we can find V + and V − in (4) and (5) by solving (7) and (8) using iterations. This is possible owing to the following lemma. The proof of this lemma can be found in [4, Lemma 2] , and a weaker form in [18] .
Lemma 2.2: Suppose that {ξ n , n < ∞} is a Markov chain with state space S, absorbing states ∂S, and transition probabilities p(x, y|r 1 , r 2 ). Let there be a real number γ > 0 satisfying (9) for some n, and c(x, r 1 , r 2 ) be continuous in r 1 and r 2 . For each admissible control, (u 1 , u 2 ), the cost W (x, u 1 , u 2 ) is defined by (3) . Then W (x, u 1 , u 2 ) is finite and solutions of (7) and (8) 
, the unique solution of (7) as n → ∞.
converges to V − (x), the unique solution of (8) as n → ∞.
III. EXISTENCE OF SADDLE POINTS
In this section, we provide sufficient conditions for the existence of saddle points in discrete Markov games. An existence proof is established through a series of inequalities. In addition, the definition of relaxed controls is given as a generalization of ordinary controls. It is shown that saddle points always exist in a relaxed control space, which is parallel to the result on static game with mixed strategy obtained by von Neumann [9] .
Next, we present a well-known minimax principle in static games, which was obtained by Sion in [13] .
To proceed, we need the following assumptions. (H1) p(x, y|r 1 , r 2 ) and c(x, r 1 , r 2 ) are continuous and separable in r 1 and r 2 . (H2) p(x, y|r 1 , r 2 ) and c(x, r 1 , r 2 ) are convex-concave with respect to (r 1 , r 2 ). (H3) {ξ n } is irreducible, that is, for each admissible control policy u 1 and u 2 , P u 1 ,u 2 (ξ n = y|ξ 0 = x) > 0 holds for ∀x ∈ S \ ∂S, y ∈ S and for some n. (4) and (5), respectively. Then there exists a saddle points, that is,
The dynamic programming equation of (7) and (8) can be rewritten as
Under either assumption (H1) or (H2), by Lemma 3.2,
In particular, there exists a nonempty setŜ ⊂ S, for ∀x ∈Ŝ,
It is enough to prove thatŜ = S, since for any x ∈ ∂S, V + (x) = V − (x), and further implies ρ = 0.
Suppose S \Ŝ is not empty. Let feedback control u 1 (·) and u 2 (·) be
By (H3), there existx ∈Ŝ andŜ ∈ S \Ŝ so that
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Forx given in (15), a series of inequalities follows,
By definition ofŜ, we conclude that all inequalities are indeed equal in (16) , and particularly
This impliesŷ ∈Ŝ. This leads to a contradiction. The existence of the saddle point is thus established. The above theorem gives sufficient conditions for the existence of saddle points. We note that there always exist saddle points in a relaxed control space with merely continuity assumed.
Definition 3.4:
A control policy {(m 1,n , m 2,n ), n < ∞} for the chain {ξ n , n < ∞} is said to be a relaxed control policy, if m i,n is a probability measure on B(U i ), a σ-algebra of Borel subsets of U i .
More general definition of relaxed control is given by Definition 4.1 in the context of stochastic differential games. Let P(U 1 ) and P(U 2 ) be collection of probability measure on B(U 1 ) and B(U 2 ). Slightly abusing notations, we gener-
Using the notation of relaxed control representation, the transition probability function is
and the cost under the relaxed control policy
Using Γ i (1) to denote the space of admissible relaxed controls that player i goes first. That is, for m i ∈ Γ i (1), there exists a sequence of measurable functions H n (·) taking values in P(U i ) such that
Analogously, using Γ i (2) to denote the space of admissible relaxed controls that player i goes last. That is,
The upper and lower values associated with relaxed control space are defined by
respectively. To proceed, we present another static game result using mixed strategies obtained by von Neumann [9] . Lemma 3.5: Let M 1 and M 2 be finite sets. Let φ(·, ·) be a function on M 1 × M 2 , µ 1 ∈ P(M 1 ) and µ 2 ∈ P(M 2 ) be probability measure on M 1 and M 2 , then 
Then the dynamic programming equation in relaxed control space can be written by
By Lemma 3.5 and the continuity of p(x, y|·, ·) and c(x, ·, ·), we have
The rest of this proof is similar to the that of (16) . The details are omitted.
IV. NUMERICAL METHODS REGIME-SWITCHING STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
In this section, we formulate stochastic differential games with regime switching. Numerical methods using Markov chain approximation leads to a sequence of discrete Markov games discussed in the previous section. The use of Theorem 3.3 gives sufficient conditions for the existence of saddle points, and facilitates the proof.
A. Formulation
Consider a two-player stochastic game of regimeswitching diffusions. For a finite set M = {1, . . . , m 0 },
, the dynamic system is given by
where for each i = 1, 2, u i (·) is a control for player i, w(·) is a standard R l 0 -valued Brownian motion, and α(·) is a continuous-time Markov chain having state space M with generator Q = (q ι, ) ∈ R m0×m0 . Let {F t : 0 ≤ t} be a filtration, which might depend on controls, and which measures at least {(w(s), α(s)) : s ≤ t}. We suppose that for each i = 1, 2, u i (·) is F t -adapted taking values in a compact subset U i ⊂ R, which are called admissible controls.
, which is symmetric and positive definite.
Let G ⊂ R l0 be a compact set that is the closure of its interior G 0 and τ be the first exit time of
Using a real number β > 0 to denote the discount factor, let the cost function be
βs k(x(s), α(s), u(s))ds
where k(·) and g(·) are functions representing the running cost and terminal cost, respectively, and E u x,ι denotes the expectation taken with the initial data x(0) = x and α(0) = ι and given control process u(·) = (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)). Next, we introduce the relaxed control representation; see [6] , [7] . 
The functionτ (·) is continuous as a mapping from convex-concave with respect to (r 1 , r 2 ) , and there exist R l0 -valued continuous functions 0, 1, 2, 3) such that b(x, ι, r 1 , r 2 
Assumption (A4) is used for construction of transition probabilities of the approximating Markov chain. It requires that the diffusion matrix be diagonally dominated. If the given dynamic system does not satisfy (A4), then we can adjust the coordinate system to satisfy assumption (A4); see [7, p. 110] . (A5) is a broad condition that is satisfied in most applications. The main purpose is to avoid the tangency problem discussed in [7, p. 278 ]. Later, we will establish the existence of saddle points using either (A6) or (A7) in addition to (A1)-(A5). Condition (A7) allows non-separable differential games with respect to controls. Now we are ready to define upper values, lower values, and saddle points of the differential games; see [6] for the corresponding definitions of systems without regime switching. For each i, let U i be a collection of all admissible ordinary control with respect to (w(·), α(·))}.
Let L 1 (∆) ⊂ U 1 (∆) denote the set of such piecewise constant controls for player 1 that are determined by measurable real-valued functions Q 1,n (·)
We can define L 2 (∆) and the associated rule u 2 for player 2 analogous to (24). Thus we can always suppose that if the control of (for example) player 1 is determined by a form such as (24), then (in relaxed control terminology) the law of (w(t), α(t), m 2 (t)) for n∆ ≤ t < (n + 1)∆ is determined recursively by past information 
If the lower and upper values are equal, then we say there exists a saddle point for the game, and its value is
B. Markov Chain Approximations
Here, we will construct a two-component Markov chain. The discretization of differential game leads to a sequence of discrete Markov games. The approximation is of finite difference type. The basis of the approximation is a discretetime, finite-state, controlled Markov chain {(ξ h n , α h n ) : n < ∞} whose properties are locally consistent with that of (21).
For each h > 0, let G h be a finite subset of G such that
Let {(ξ h n , α h n ) : n < ∞} be a controlled discrete-time Markov chain on a discrete state space G h × M with transition probabilities denoted by p h ((x, ι), (y, )|r), where r = (r 1 , r 2 ) ∈ U 1 × U 2 . We use (u h 1,n , u h 2,n ) to denote the actual control action for the chain at discrete time n. Suppose we have a positive function ∆t x,ι,n the conditional expectation, covariance, and probability given {ξ
To approximate the cost in (23), we define a cost function using the Markov chain above. Let
h n ) with transition probabilities {p h (·)} and interpolation ∆t h (·) defined above is locally consistent with (21).
Proof. The criterion in (30) can be verified through a series of calculations; the details are omitted.
Theorem 4.5: Assume that (A1)-(A5), either (A6) or (A7), and that G h is a finite set defined above (29). For 45th IEEE CDC, San Diego, USA, Dec. [13] [14] [15] 2006 FrIP9.9
x ∈ G h and ι ∈ M, a Markov chain is defined by (34 (2) . Then there exists a saddle point
provided h satisfies (35).
Proof. The condition (9) is satisfied due to the discount factor β > 0. Let
Assumptions (A6) and (A7) lead to (H1) and (H2), respectively. The result holds by Theorem 3.3.
Although the proof of the next lemma is complicated and non-trivial (see [7] , [5] , and [6] for the corresponding results without switching), it is omitted due to the space limitation. 
V. FURTHER REMARKS One of the key points in dealing with zero-sum games is the existence of saddle point. This paper is devoted to sufficient conditions for the existence of saddle points in discrete Markov game. Using dynamic programming equation method, we are able to use static game results of Sion [13] and von Neumann [9] to discover the sufficient conditions. A direct application is numerical methods for stochastic differential game problems.
The transition probabilities used in (34) require restrictions (35) on h. Practically, we can develop the transition probabilities by upward finite difference scheme so the restriction on h can be removed. It can be routinely calculated to verify the local consistency. This kind of discrete Markov games might have different upper and lower values for some h. However, both the upper and lower values in this situation converge to the original saddle point of differential game V (x) by Lemma 4.6 and Theorem 4.7. Numerical examples in pursuit-evasion games will be reported elsewhere.
For a regime-switching system in which the Markov chain has a large state space, we may use the ideas of two-timescale approach presented in [16] (see also [17] and references therein) to first reduce the complexity of the underlying system and then construct numerical solutions for the limit systems. Optimal strategies of the limit systems can be used for constructing approximation strategies leading to near optimality.
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